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■  1  arold Washington’s election as Chicago’s first black mayor in April 
1 9 8 3  was the product of unprecedented participation in the local electoral 
process by large segments of Chicago’s racially, ethnically, and socio­
economically diverse population, segments that had been previously 
alienated from the political mainstream. This participation was facilitated 
by the formation of a loosely unified coalition of reform-minded institu­
tional elites (dubbed “insiders” herein) and progressive community 
activists and political insurgents (“outsiders”).
There were certainly some institutionalized insider elements— members 
of the city council, ward committeemen and women, career city officials—  
who helped to effect Washington’s election and to participate in gover­
nance of the city once the election was won. Their support ranged from 
ardently enthusiastic to plain opportunistic. Some became converts to 
Washington’s program, as though they had always been waiting for such 
leadership. Others were politically ambitious careerists and political entre­
preneurs who claimed to support the reform aims that Washington sym­
bolized. They paid lip service to the reform program to the extent that it 
provided opportunities for their own self-aggrandizement or protected 
their political futures.
But what was most striking was the extent of organization and the 
painstakingly developed programmatic focus of the outsider part of the 
coalition. In Chicago during 1 9 8 2 -1 9 8 7 , movement politics was as impor­
tant as insider maneuvering. It had its own logic and rules of organization. 
One can identify three main groups, loosely organized around three main 
ideas:
First, Mayor Washington’s electoral base was overwhelmingly Black in 
composition, with the critical support of poor Latinos and poor whites. 
There was tremendous electoral mobilization of the Black community un­
der united black leadership. Blacks, in the main, had endured decades of
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political exclusion and public neglect. Even while their numbers had in­
creased significantly, they had received little more than symbolic 
participation in the economic and political life of the city. The black com­
munity organized politically, in both formal and informal ways, with a 
nearly single-minded purposefulness.
Second, the Harold Washington electoral coalition received the support 
of reform-minded liberal whites, as well as Jewish and black business elites. 
For these, and to some extent the other elements of the coalition, there was 
a consensus that the conventional practice of machine politics had to be 
rejected. Were Chicago to go forward into the twenty-first century, it had to 
shed its image of racist politics, corruption, graft, patronage, and un­
merited privilege. There was a pervasive assault upon the patronage-based 
political machine of the regular Democratic party inherited from the era of 
Mayor Richard J. Daley.
Third, the movement underpinning Harold Washington’s campaign and 
his early administration was marked by aggressive, vocal, and independent 
action on the part of people associated with neighborhood organizations 
and community action groups. These community activists had been iso­
lated from meaningful political participation in prior regimes. Now, they 
pressed their demands for a neighborhood agenda that included greater 
effective input in decision making about the city’s future and a greater share 
of city funds to be expended in the neighborhoods relative to the central 
business district, O ’Hare, and the Near Loop Lakefront areas.
The other part of the story is that, among movement elements, while the 
most obvious thing is the mobilization of the black and allied groups—  
e.g., Latinos, poor whites, ethnics— a critical part of movement organiza­
tion and the dominant substantive program came from the economic 
development initiatives that had emerged over a period of years from the 
community-based organizations and networks. The community-based net­
work was critical to the larger outsider social movement and coalition, 
providing a large part of its organizational basis and the substance of much 
of its policy direction. As a result, the community-based movement was 
prominent in Washington administration initiatives after the 1983 
election.
The purpose of this chapter is to describe how this rise to prominence of 
the community-based agenda came about, and how these ideas and inter­
ests fared once Washington and his immediate successor, Eugene Sawyer, 
were in office during 1 9 8 3 -1 9 8 9 .1 treat the story as four topics: (1) a brief 
summary of the economic and political background out of which the larger 
outsider coalition emerged; (2) the twenty-year development of the com­
munity development wing of that coalition and how it contributed to the 
initial 1982/83 campaign; (3) the experience of that group’s program in the
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Washington administrative and political program after the election; and 
(4) some brief concluding thoughts on the future of the community devel­
opm ent coalition.
Economic and Political Background
The history leading up to the successful election of Harold Washington 
as mayor of Chicago is described in many publications; in this section I 
review this history, but it is not purely an objective setting out of the facts. It 
is also an account by a participant and is, in part, a statement of a view of 
this history as it was seen by me and others in the community-based and 
black movement at the time.1
In some respects my own position in this history— often peripheral to 
the main events but in a position to observe them— has fitted me to tell this 
story. I came to Chicago in 1979 from North Carolina, did doctoral work 
in the Northwestern University political science department, then took 
positions as researcher and organizer in such groups as the Illinois Council 
for Black Studies, the Chicago Rehab Network, and most recently the 
Kenwood-Oakland Community Organization (KOCO). My dissertation 
research was on the Task Force for Black Political Empowerment, one of 
the central groups in the effort to mobilize support for Harold Wash­
ington’s election during the fall of 1982, and I had been one of the charter 
members of that coalition effort. I have also been active in coalition­
building activities within the reform and progressive wings of the neighbor­
hood empowerment movement and electoral politics. I am currently on the 
board of directors of the Chicago Workshop for Economic Development (a 
group that I helped to found), the Chicago Rehab Network, and the Neigh­
borhood Capital Budget Group. All have been important citywide 
coalitions having an impact upon the course of public policy reform and 
the resources available to the people. The following account reflects these 
experiences. It is as objective as I can make it; where it seems to depart from 
“mainstream” interpretations of this history, I try to so indicate.
Economic Crisis
The relevant history— so we believe— begins with the economy. Over 
several decades, major changes took place within Chicago’s economy. 
These economic changes necessitated changes in the prevailing political 
system, in government policies and practices. The old political arrange-
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ment of the “machine” associated with Richard J. Daley, mayor from 1956 
to 1976, and his successors (Michael Bilandic and Jane Byrne) through the 
1983 election had been based upon the doling out of patronage in the form 
of jobs and contracts, which served to maintain personal loyalties between 
machine elites and their ethnic-based constituencies. This system had be­
come increasingly inappropriate to address the needs of large numbers of 
African-Americans who had begun to occupy several of Chicago’s neigh­
borhoods in the period following World War I, as well as the needs of the 
Latinos and Asians whose numbers grew apace in the post-World War II 
period. In fact, the twenty years of Chicago’s race relations leading up to 
the 1983 mayoral election were marked by a series of recurrent political 
confrontations, protests, and disruptions of normal patterns of urban 
behavior. This was due to the ever present effects of an increasingly intense 
urban crisis. It was essentially an economic crisis, but it manifested itself in 
the political arena as the heightening contradiction between declining 
sources of public revenues and the growing level of legitimate demands for 
public services and assistance.2 In short, the ruling elites could not rule 
through the traditional arrangements, and vast sectors of the population 
grew increasingly intolerant of “business (or politics) as usual.” The gov­
ernment thus became a contested arena of political battle.
Thus the urban crisis had several interrelated dimensions: economic, 
fiscal, and political. In past studies of Chicago politics many have argued 
the interconnectedness of these elements.3 But what the Washington elec­
tion made clear was the underlying importance of a fourth dimension— the 
direct mobilization of a new social base. Much of this new politics is non- 
institutionalized (i.e., movement politics or social protest politics), 
involving social movements and factions that arose from fundamental 
shifts in the city’s political economy— producing a social crisis marked by 
the inability of large segments of the population to gain income adequate to 
support viable households. The consequences were increased crime, deteri­
oration of major social institutions, and the breakdown in the quality of 
community life.
Black Social Base and Political Solidarity
This crisis affected many groups, but a lot of it was specific to blacks. 
Historically, black people had long played an integral part in the political 
and economic life of the city, and this produced their political aspirations 
and motivations as well as their potential as a collective agency of socio­
political change. First, blacks were not recent arrivals to Chicago. The 
town was founded by a black man, Jean Baptiste Point DuSable, and there 
was a permanent settlement of blacks here— albeit most were refugees
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from southern slavery— at the time that Chicago was incorporated in 
1 8 3 7 . Later, a combination of southern racist terror and repression and the 
industrial expansion during World War 1 spurred blacks to migrate to 
Chicago in the hope of finding stable employment, good schools, and ade­
quate housing in a less hostile environment; and the great South Side 
enclaves grew at increasing rates between 1920 and the 1950s.
But the peak of Chicago’s industrial expansion had been reached during 
the 1920s. Therefore, although the early black arrivals into Chicago were 
proletarianized and integrated into the production side of the industrial 
economy, each subsequent generation of blacks and most urban-bom 
Afro-Chicagoans were increasingly marginalized and alienated from the 
production side of the local economy. By the time black immigration into 
the Chicago area subsided, the mostly white (ethnic-based) working class 
had been fully proletarianized for several generations. Their progeny fully 
benefited as the United States became the preeminent economic and polit­
ical world power after the two global wars. While white working-class 
families had access to open unions and the newly consolidated Democratic 
machine to enhance their status as a privileged stratum within a multiracial 
working class, blacks were excluded from full and open access to all but a 
few unions and they were limited in their political participation by the ma­
chine. While blacks had limited mobility within the political machine 
between 1930 and 1983, white ethnics used the machine as an instrument 
of upward social mobility.
Thus blacks were absorbed into the industrial work force in Chicago—  
at all levels— at lesser rates and lower pay than were whites. It is true that as 
the outcome of fierce struggle through the New Deal, Square Deal, New 
Frontier, and Great Society periods blacks were more or less completely 
absorbed into the public economy, mainly on the social consumption side, 
and integrated into civic relations (i.e., civil rights gains, increased voter 
registration, the Fair Housing Act, etc.), while making gains in political of­
fice holding as their numbers increased in given political jurisdictions. But 
even at the beginning of the 1980s black integration into the mainstream of 
the urban political economy remained tediously incomplete. It was slowed 
by the new conservatism in U.S. politics ushered in by the Reagan admin­
istration, and by the precarious position of the vast majority of the black 
middle class whose income, status, and occupations were overwhelmingly 
tied to the welfare state and to public employment (i.e., teachers, public 
administrators, civil servants, government-regulated affirmative action 
contracts, and employment in social service programs). As recently as 1985 
a survey found that more than 67  percent of black middle-class income ear­
ners were dependent on public sector jobs. Moreover, the heavy depen­
dence of poor black families on public assistance had become a cause for 
national alarm, if not action.4
In contrast, a smaller percentage of the white middle-class and poor
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whites in Chicago were tied to the public sector for employment and/or 
transfer payments. A higher percentage of whites derived income from the 
production side of the economy. This accounts for a significant amount of 
the conservatism on the part of whites who perceive their taxes as support­
ing black welfare recipients.
The black middle class had aspirations and interests similar to those of 
their white counterparts. On the consumption side, many middle-class 
blacks aped the tastes of the white middle class in order to escape their so­
cietal identification with the lifestyles of most blacks and were pained by 
the perceptions of the black masses held by most whites. Thus, there was 
not only the growing gap between most whites and most blacks but also a 
growing class differentiation among blacks. This reality and the relative di­
vergence of interests among blacks along class lines had important 
ramifications for unifying and coalition building in the black political com­
munity.
However, their precarious position in the social structure forced the 
black middle class into alliances with the black masses in defense of their 
status and in defense of public sector expansion of human and social ser­
vices. Moreover, race and racism were constant forces contributing to 
black solidarity. Particularly among blacks when there was a threat of racist 
attack, the political community united. In 1983 there was the widespread 
perception that interests of importance to blacks as a whole were being 
threatened. Unity was possible. For a magical moment, there was the oc­
currence of all-class unity among blacks— with the united leadership 
scurrying frantically to stay out in front of the masses. This unity, initially 
defensive in nature, was transformed into an offensive to capture city hall 
through a black candidate whose campaign was fueled by an unprece­
dented political solidarity among blacks and supported by most Latinos 
and significant numbers of whites.
The Machine from Daley Through Byrne
It is important to understand Mayor Richard J. Daley’s role (1955— 
1976). On the one hand we know him as a national figure, even a folk hero, 
or folk antagonist, in American political literature. But as a “machine 
boss” he played a significant role in presiding over the political and eco­
nomic transformation of Chicago from an industrial city to an urban 
metropolis. Under his leadership, Chicago experienced the first signs of ur­
ban crisis, as cracks appeared in the political arena resulting from the 
transformation of the economy. Daley continued to do business as usual, 
but he was also caught up in the management of crisis and he needed to 
figure out ways to keep his patronage base intact.
During his long reign as mayor of the city and chairman of the Cook
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County Democratic party, Daley was in fact becoming more and more vul­
nerable with each passing election. His electoral coalition and his support 
base got more tenuous. This was in part because the machine only turned 
out as many people as it needed to win. It was also partly due to a growing 
antimachine vote. That antimachine vote was registered initially in several 
local ward elections where certain independents would win election in one 
term (such as in the 6th, 44th and 16th wards) only to lose in a subsequent 
election. They were not able to sustain or consolidate power. After Daley’s 
death in 1976 a new independent trend was able to emerge, particularly in 
the Lakefront wards and the West Side predominantly black wards by 
1979 .
In black political terms, an understanding of the role of Daley was impor­
tant in this period. By 1971 black political representation in the city 
council reached a point where it was proportional to the percentage of 
blacks in the population. Blacks were 28.1 percent of the population base 
in the 1970 census, and in 1 9 7 1 ,1 4  of the 50 ward aldermen (council mem­
bers) were blacks. So you could say that in empirical terms blacks had 
“maxed-out” on their “power batting average” in terms of achieving pro­
portional representation.5
The thrust of black politics shifted from participation to power politics. 
The antimachine sentiment gained momentum in the period after Daley’s 
death. His demise precipitated a succession controversy that pitted the ma­
chine against the black community in a symbolic struggle of major 
proportions. At the center of the conflict was Alderman Wilson Frost of the 
34th ward, legally in direct line to replace Daley. Frost, the mayor pro tern, 
was not allowed (at gunpoint) entrance into the mayor’s office to assume 
the duties of the mayor until Daley’s successor could be appointed. Blacks 
were incensed. As part of the compromise that made Michael Bilandic 
mayor for 1 9 7 6 -1 9 7 9 , Frost was offered the chair of the powerful Finance 
Committee of the city council, which he secretly accepted while thousands 
of blacks ringed city hall demanding his installation as mayor. Now the 
black insult level had truly “maxed-out.”
Another factor was that Daley’s coalition among the ethnic neighbor­
hoods began to deteriorate. The Polish community resented the Irish lock 
on public patronage. But they fared better than blacks, so they were told. 
Daley also had other troubles. He had long been able to secure support of 
the unions. But there developed a split between the union bureaucratic 
leadership and the rank and file, particularly within locals that had large 
black memberships. Over the years a union leadership endorsement began 
to carry less political weight, while racism was the political measuring stick 
in union halls’ relationships to city hall.
A further factor in the weakening of the machine was the growth of the 
same type of nationality movements among blacks, Latinos, and other
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groups in Chicago that became prominent in other cities. This was consist­
ent with that whole thrust toward community control and empowerment 
that came out of the Black Power movement. Residents who lived and 
worked in areas of the city targeted for redevelopment desired and exerted 
greater input over the course of economic development in their com­
munities. They had to be convinced that development proposals were not 
just good for the city but were compatible with retaining the stability of 
their neighborhood areas.
For instance, the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) pro­
cess, established under the Housing and Community Development Act of 
1974, became an arena of struggle. From 1974 until Daley died (and under 
Mayor Bilandic, who succeeded him) the Community Development 
Advisory Committee (CDAC) was a rubber stamp. It was mandated by the 
federal legislation, which required maximum feasible participation of local 
funding districts— the key word here being feasible. From the standpoint of 
the Daley and Bilandic regimes the CDAC process was little more than a 
perfunctory obligation. But by the early 1980s the CDBG budgetary, reg­
ulatory, and evaluative process had evolved into a significantly altered form 
with many democratic features. Under Mayor Washington it would be­
come a peer review mechanism that effectively interacted with the city 
administration to set priories and make CDBG allocation decisions.
Thus, the weakening of the machine had already started under Daley, but 
it became very clear with Jane Byrne’s election in 1979. Her maverick cam­
paign, which ousted Bilandic, and her subsequent governance period 
provided new lessons. We can summarize these lessons quickly as repre­
senting four things:
First, neighborhoods provided her the basis for victory (at least, activists 
claimed that, whether they did so or not).
Second, there was the antimachine character of the vote. Byrne won be­
cause she was viewed as being in opposition to “business as usual.” There 
was a real democratic sentiment within the city among alienated segments 
that could be mobilized into the electorate. Byrne was able to tap this senti­
ment, although she did not consolidate it.
Third, Byrne’s election represented a palace revolt of sorts within the 
fragmented party that was exploitable. There was a power struggle within 
the machine. Almost immediately after taking office she abandoned the 
neighborhood agenda and closed ranks with the Vrdolyak faction of the 
party against George Dunne, president of the county board, and the Daley 
family. (It was the Daley family that had Byrne fired as commissioner of 
consumer affairs under Bilandic. This dismissal led to a political blood 
feud between the Daleys and Jane Byrne.)
Fourth, the deepening political/fiscal crisis is key to understanding Byrne. 
The fact is that she had to do  something. This increased the likelihood
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of the series of tactical errors in handling the crisis that sealed her doom and 
downfall. If they had not come in 1982, they certainly would have by 1987. 
She speeded up the process of her own loss of credibility by committing 
political blunders like destabilizing black political representation on 
boards and committees, and misuse of funds that were allocated under the 
C D B G  process to go into low-income areas. She reprogrammed those 
funds into purchasing snow removal equipment and into paying the pen­
sion funds of teachers. This provided a rallying point for opposition on her 
own CDAC, which became more independent and assertive. Groups like 
the Rehab Network began to expose Byrne’s misuse of the funds in other 
areas in which she had abandoned the neighborhood agenda. The Rehab 
Netw ork, the Chicago 1992 Committee, and the newly formed CWED 
(Community Workshop for Economic Development) coalition began to 
popularize a critique of Byrne’s development policies and practices. Mean­
w hile, groups like Operation PUSH, the Urban League, and Chicago Black 
United Communities (CBUC)— groups whose leaders had not sat collec­
tively for years— began to meet. This coalescing of diverse black interest 
groups led to the formation of the Task Force for Black Political Empower­
m ent in November 1982, following Washington’s announcement of his 
candidacy for mayor.
Development of Community Organizations 
Through the 1983 Election
T he economic changes in Chicago increased the differences between the 
older white ethnic neighborhoods and the newer neighborhoods occupied 
by peoples of color. The former were ethnic based; the latter were com­
munities based upon socioeconomic and political conditions of exclusion 
from the mainstream. There is the tradition of Chicago as a city of diverse 
neighborhoods organized around institutions of cohesion such as church, 
school, or union meeting hall. These traditional neighborhoods were 
thought to possess a positive sense of cultural (ethnic) identity. On the 
other hand, the new “neighborhoods” were a postindustrial, post-1960s 
phenomenon. These new neighborhoods were demarcated by the common 
condition of their residents— homogeneously black or brown, homoge­
neously poor and depressed, homogeneously identified by the prevalence 
of deteriorated housing and commercial districts and by public sector 
neglect.
In these types of neighborhoods there also emerged new types of com­
munity organizations. The new community organizations were concerned
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about change, survival, and redevelopment as opposed to the older organi­
zations, which focused upon the preservation of the neighborhood 
character. The first group of neighborhood organizations appeared in the 
1930s and 1940s. The second emerged during the 1960s and thereafter un­
der the influence of the civil rights movement and its tactics of direct action.
The traditional type of neighborhood organization was improvement 
oriented, exclusivist and conservationist. The more recent form of organi­
zation typically emerged around the need for defense from racist attacks 
and for resistance to withdrawal of public services, and mobilized around 
demands for improvement in the standard of living and quality of life. 
Rather than resulting from concerns about preservation of status, the new 
neighborhood organizations were instruments of the community enabling 
it to fight back and to achieve reform. They often produced leadership with 
more radical or progressive orientations than their predecessors.
These organizations in the new period were characterized initially by 
protest. They went through several phases. An example is the Kenwood— 
Oakland Community Organization (KOCO), which was formed in 1965. 
KOCO was organized mainly around tenants and other dislocated or 
alienated groups whose membership was essentially tenant based. While 
they took up other issues like unemployment, the struggle for representa­
tion in the unions, welfare rights, and union work, they were essentially 
struggling to get in the system or to get more out of it. They sought reform 
by opening up access, shaping government policy and practice, or fighting 
for constituent representation on public boards and commissions.
There were many groups that fit somewhere in between KOCO and the 
traditional type of neighborhood organization. The Midwest Community 
Council (MCC), for example, was organized almost exclusively around 
block clubs. Block clubs tend to be conservationist. There are certain paral­
lels between the old-style groups and MCC. A group like The Woodlawn 
Organization (TWO), however, is representative of community organiza­
tions that are hybrid, including both block clubs and tenants. There were 
also some church-based community organizations that relied less on pro­
test and more on development initiatives.
By the end of the 1960s and through the mid-1970s, the tendency was 
toward self-help activities. The orientation was also toward more isola­
tionist activities based on the nationalism that emerged in the late 1960s. 
Organizations began to talk about “doing-for-self ” under the influence of 
the Nation of Islam (and to a certain extent from the Black Panther party 
organization) with its self-help education and breakfast programs. This 
represented a trend towards cultural or political autonomy and self- 
determination. “Black is beautiful,” when translated into the social con­
text, implied a certain kind of isolationism. “Turf” concerns became a 
major characteristic of that kind of community organization.
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By the end of the 1970s, a shift occurred toward “developmentalism” 
and policy “advocacy.” This shift toward power politics and away from 
protest was based on the reality that blacks, Latinos, and poor whites con­
stituted the new majority in Chicago. Most community organizations 
found this shift acceptable. There occurred a sort of synthetic organiza­
tional development where many of the organizations either were aligned 
with a “protest” organization or advocacy group; or they would spin off a 
community development organization as Northwest Community Organi­
zation had done with Bickerdike or as KOCO had done. KOCO did the 
social services and advocacy work on behalf of tenant constituencies, par­
ents, or youth. On the other side of the shop, they created a specially 
designed Kenwood—Oakland Development Corporation (KODC). The de­
velopment corporation was under the control of the parent organization 
but had people on the board who brought a certain technical expertise—  
making possible rehabilitation and new construction projects in housing 
and commercial development. While they differed in style and capacity, 
these groups all had one thing in common: they had emerged in struggles 
against the local political system in some form or another. And they had 
some level of connection to constituents most affected by the urban crisis 
through their outreach efforts.
These organizations tended to be anticorporate, antiunion, antimachine, 
mass oriented, and the source of an emergent indigenous leadership. They 
became alternative paths for political leadership to emerge, particularly in 
the late 1970s and through the 1980s. Thus community-based organiza­
tion (CBO) leaders like alderpersons Danny Davis, Ed Smith, Dorothy 
Tillm an, Helen Schiller, Percy Giles, Marlene Carter, and Bobby Rush 
developed from within community struggles. They went into the institu­
tionalized political structure. They went into the electoral arena and won 
election onto the city council as they defeated machine-backed incum­
bents, while numerous community activists went into major adminis­
trative positions within city government— particularly under Harold 
Washington and his successor, Eugene Sawyer.
O n the other hand, most community organizations were not indige­
nously led, mass-led organizations. Their (indigenous) boards might enact 
policy. However, most were staff driven. Even among the few that were 
board driven, the central character of their leadership was middle class by 
function, orientation, accumulated experience, and training. The staff be­
came more professionalized and bureaucratized. (This development was 
accelerated after 1983 through the capacity-building strategies of city ad­
ministrative policymakers under Mayor Washington.)
This staff development resulted in a new complexion. On the one hand, 
the staff and much of the board leadership in most community organiza­
tions represented a militant, radicalized wing of the community-based
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movement. But there was also the dominance of bureaucratic and legal re­
lations that the community organizations had with their private and public 
sources of funding. These relations set limits upon the range of options 
open to most community-based actors. To be a “delegate agency” of the 
state was to become credentialed by the government to act on its behalf. To 
some extent they were constrained by these legal relations; their indepen­
dence and initiative were circumscribed, limited, and therefore controlled.
Nevertheless, the community organizations of the new type were more 
open to coalition building, networking, and sharing and pooling resources 
than were the older traditional organizations. While they still adhered to 
the principle of mutual respect for each group’s “local agenda,” they were 
open to establishing ad hoc committees of their peers to work on single 
issues. An example was opposition of many activists to the so-called 
Chicago 21 Plan, which had been promoted by the Chicago Central Area 
Committee in 1971. The Chicago 21 Plan (or the “Master Plan”) proposed 
the use of public dollars to promote massive private redevelopment of the 
new Loop South, West, and Northwest crescent as part of a large-scale ur­
ban renewal plan.
Such single-issue coalition building among black, brown, and white re­
form or progressive community-based groups remained the dominant type 
of associational network. In the mid-1970s networks with formal mem­
berships began to emerge. One such group was the Chicago Rehab Net­
work, which was formed in about 1976. Part of the impetus for it was the 
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974. This legislation pro­
vided resources through the Community Development Block Grant 
(CDBG) process, for the city to delegate to certain community-based actors 
a role in administering city-funded programs— federally funded programs 
with the city as the lead agency. A number of those groups came together in 
1975, and over the next couple of years they formed the Rehab Network to 
provide technical assistance to community-based actors doing housing re­
habilitation. The other motivation on the part of the founders of the Rehab 
Network was the desire to provide an advocacy front, to speak for and with 
its affiliates rather than having the “downtown” civic organizations— with 
no community constituencies— speak for the neighborhoods, co-opting 
their agendas and brokering resources for them.
Following that successful experience with the Rehab Network, other 
coalitions of community-based actors and organizations began to appear. 
During the summer of 1982 two simultaneous coalitions emerged: The 
Chicago 1992 Committee and the Community Workshop on Economic 
Development. The 1992 Committee concentrated its efforts on opposing 
the proposed Chicago World’s Fair and exposing it as a veiled attempt 
at economic development that sought to use public resources to pro­
mote massive gentrification and wholesale displacement on the Near West
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and South sides. The Community Workshop on Economic Development 
(CW ED , pronounced “see-wed”) emerged in response to the Reagan- 
supported “enterprise zone” concept and Job Training Partnership Act. In 
both cases the fear among community activists was that the private sector 
would receive large inducements and incentive benefits without significant 
resources being recaptured by actors seeking control over the economic de­
velopment process in their respective communities. These proposals were 
rejected because they were “top-down” rather than emerging on the basis 
of community initiative and reflecting the needs of local communities.
Politicization
The CBO social policy movement was converted into a political move­
ment and steered into the electoral process through ( 1 ) broadening the base 
of the coalition by identifying the new allies on a mass scale, and (2) a pro­
cess of agenda building and popularization of a new emerging consensus 
that Byrne and the machine could not/would not deliver on this agenda.6
Political organizing through the electoral process broadened the base of 
the movement. It provided the opportunity to dismantle the political ma­
chine and set the stage for social and public policy reform under the 
leadership of Harold Washington. Both CWED and the Chicago 1992 
Committee were composed of people who were exercising leadership 
within the Chicago Rehab Network. However, each group was successful 
because it was able to attract membership and participation from a more 
diverse range of community groups doing development or engaged in 
community-specific struggles.
I cite the Rehab Network because I think it was a central forum and one 
of the leading agencies promoting community-based coalition building. It 
was a harbinger of various kinds of groups that came on the scene in the 
period from 1981 to 1983. It led to a proliferation of networks. Groups 
emerged like the Illinois Coalition Against Reagan Economics (I-CARE); 
and following that, during the summer of 1982, more mass-based militant 
groups like POWER, the People’s Organization for Welfare Economic 
Reform. POWER was the successor to I-CARE, as a coalition of grass-roots 
participants. The Rehab Nerwork/CWED model, and the I-CARE/ 
POWER model emerged as two of the predominant types that formed 
in this period. They attempted to bring neighborhood-based activists 
across the city in black, brown and low-income white communities into 
the political process through policy advocacy and through electoral 
participation.
Groups like the Rehab Network and CWED provided forums for the ex­
change of experiences and ideas across race lines and across sectors of the
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community. I-CARE and POWER represented more insurgent protest and 
were less institutionalized. While there were differences between them, 
I-CARE and POWER were clearly oriented more toward mass pro- 
test/resistance, while the Rehab Network and CWED represented a forum 
for the leadership of formally organized CBOs with specific agendas, under 
essentially middle-class leadership. I-CARE was also under middle-class 
leadership, but it had a mass base among some labor unions, public service 
recipients, and civil service employers. POWER represented an attempt to 
fuse unemployed workers and welfare recipients with community activists 
and progressives who had a long term interest in promoting radical social 
change.
POWER— at least temporarily— demonstrated what the potential for 
such organizational work could be when leadership was provided by a 
group of radicalized, militant community activists with roots in mass com­
munity struggles among poor people. POWER tended to be more 
democratic; I-CARE was more elitist. The I-CARE/POWER groups were 
composed essentially of the direct or indirect recipients of social services 
and neighborhood-based programs. The CWED and the Rehab Network 
groups were composed of public-assisted CBOs that coalesced and hired 
staff who provided some technical expertise.
By 1982 the more mass-based coalitions like POWER had moved to 
another level. They urged their constituents and activists to escape the 
limitations of “turfism.” They were “anti-turf” organizations in the sense 
that black, Latino, and low-income white community constituents were 
encouraged to view development threats to their communities in the con­
text of the entire city of which they were a part. They mobilized support 
with the argument that certain megadevelopment projects proposed by big 
developers and the machine, as well as antiurban federal and state policies, 
would be devastating for individual neighborhoods and for the overall 
public economy of Chicago. In this sense these groups were broad class 
coalitions that represented the vast majority of the city’s population in con­
tention with the policies supported by the corporate elites and their cronies 
in city government.
Finally, it must be made clear that middle-class professional activists 
penetrated and assumed important positions of leadership and influence 
within these citywide advocacy coalitions— of both types. These were not 
merely spontaneous, purposeless coalitional efforts. Moreover, the activ­
ists’ associations existed prior to Harold Washington’s campaign bid in 
1982. In each instance the organizations were implicitly, if not explicitly, 
opposed to the machine in power. Many activists at the local and coalition 
level had been involved in antimachine electoral campaigns and pubic 
policy struggles over the previous 10—20 years dating back to the early 
1960s. Some had been involved in struggles against Mayor Daley in 1963,
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1 9 6 6 , and in 1968 .7 Others had opposed the city’s handling of the in­
fam ous Fred H am pton-M ark Clark assassinations.8 M ost of the Chicago 
R ehab Network early membership had worked with each other in opposi­
tion to  the redlining practices of banks and insurance companies and in the 
city wide resistance to the Chicago 21 Plan to redevelop the South Loop 
and the Near North and West Sides as gentrified middle-class 
communities.
Coalition Agenda Setting
The Chicago Rehab Network and the Community Workshop on Eco­
nom ic Development both drew upon the common experiences of their 
diverse member groups in order to shape a neighborhood agenda, particu­
larly around housing, land use, economic development, and resource 
allocation for depressed neighborhoods. The 1981/82 period in Chicago 
was replete with numerous protest struggles within pubic institutions as 
the crisis deepened. Perhaps the most significant development for our cur­
rent discussion was the struggle to prevent Chicago from sponsoring a 
W orld’s Fair in 1992. The World’s Fair proposal entailed much more than 
merely an opportunity for Chicago to have a good time or to host a big 
party. At the core of the issues surrounding it was a plan for the economic 
redevelopment of the Near South Side. It was viewed by many activists as a 
resurrection of the old Chicago 21 Plan. It was derisively referred to as 
“M aster Plan Number Two.” It called for the redevelopment of the area 
from 13th Street south all the way down to 31st Street and over as far as the 
Pilsen community. Parts of Pilsen and Chinatown were scheduled to be 
razed and made into parking lots for visitors to the fair. More importantly, 
there were designs to build a new residential development with m ini- 
shopping centers and malls that would have housed or employed as many 
as 3 0 0 ,0 0 0  people on the air rights over the Illinois Central Gulf Railroad 
tracks just south of the Loop. It would thus open the land use market to 
middle- and upper-income groups who desired access to the nearby 
Lakefront.
The city had a history of using public infrastructure resources to support 
private economic development: 65—80 percent of the capital improvement 
dollars allotted by the city had been expended within the Loop and O’Hare 
areas during recent administrations. What about the other 48 wards? Or 
what about the other 73 or 74 community areas? And who would pay for 
this? Under Mayor Byrne the city used its bond capacity to support Near 
Loop real estate development while the neighborhoods were neglected. 
Moreover, developers received substantial tax incentives to build projects 
that could have been developed without public support. Advocates of
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neighborhood development wanted to see more balance and linkage in re­
turn for local city support. The first issue was whether or not community 
development resources should be tied up around this engine for develop­
ment, which could be supported by private investment. Some questioned 
whether the private developers of the World’s Fair should be allowed essen­
tially to walk away with no risk while the public would bear most of the 
risk if the fair was not successful. Others hammered away at the notion that 
the World’s Fair site should contribute to strengthening existing com­
munities rather than facilitating their destruction and the displacement of 
existing residents and businesses. There was an operative consensus that 
the fair was ill designed, whether or not it should be held at all. Similarly, 
it was argued that other developers who used city capital development 
dollars should provide revenues to support housing, economic develop­
ment, and job generation in the neighborhoods. Individuals and groups 
networking around CWED, the Chicago Jobs Council, Chicago 1992 
Committee, the Rehab Network, and the Center for Neighborhood Tech­
nology began to advocate for a comprehensive urban development policy 
with the following key components:
a. Housing and commercial development should not displace 
indigenous residents and businesses.
b. Community-directed economic and housing development 
should secure the interests of local groups and include the input of 
CBOs in the planning, implementation, and benefits of private- 
public development ventures.
c. The city should encourage “balanced growth” between the 
business district and depressed neighborhoods and linkage between 
large developments using public resources and the need for 
reinvestment in the neighborhoods.
d. When developers wanted to do business with the city, they 
should expect to hire Chicagoans first, respect affirmative action and 
minority set-aside agreements, and support community-based 
initiatives in economic development by providing technical and 
financial assistance.
e. Banks and other lending institutions holding city funds or city 
employee pension funds should be pressured to support community- 
based redevelopment projects by reinvesting in depressed 
neighborhoods and by lending to public-private partnership 
ventures.
f. The city should view community-based nonprofit development 
organizations as legitimate partners in community redevelopment 
projects.
g. The city should shift a larger share of its CDBG dollars into
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direct support of housing, commercial and community 
redevelopment initiatives, and direct staff development and capacity 
building among neighborhood development organizations and 
agencies.
T h e  C om m u n ity -b ased  N etw ork  
in th e  1 9 8 3  E lection
The same forces that came together to support Jane Byrne and to defeat 
M ichael Bilandic in 1979 were at the front lines of the movement to defeat 
Byrne and elect Harold Washington in 1983 and again in 1987. The asso- 
ciational networks with linkages into the black, brown, poor white, and 
liberal Lakefront communities made possible the transformation of mass 
social protest into a massive political mobilization inside the electoral 
arena.
How was this possible? On the surface it could be characterized as a 
black nationalist movement. But beneath this was a long-building set of 
forces and linkages. Many of the most active representatives of CBOs in 
coalitions like the Rehab Network, OWED, and the Chicago 1992 Com­
mittee on the one hand and POWER on the other were active militants in 
civil rights, black empowerment, and affirmative action movements among 
the black and Latino communities. These broad associational linkages 
made possible deep and extensive outreach to constituents who could be 
politicized and steered into the electoral arena.
When Jane Byrne refused to act on a neighborhood agenda emerging out 
o f low-income communities, it was a rejection of the black and Latino activ­
ists who also became discouraged as a result of the racist effects of her 
policies with respect to nationality representation and the continuance of 
business as usual at city hall. When these groups and their leaders criticized 
her policies, she reacted viciously and revoked their public service con­
tracts. N ot only did this further incense these organizations, but it 
destroyed her credibility with reform-minded liberals and the media as 
well.
M eanwhile the community-based networks had developed an ability to 
work in concert. The Rehab Network demonstrated that multinational 
coalitions could be built on a permanent basis and could provide more 
than protest leadership. This kind of coalition could be proactive and de­
velop a progressive reform agenda, particularly around housing develop­
ment. CW ED, which shared an overlapping constituency with the Rehab 
Network, differentiated itself by focusing on community economic devel­
opment issues and CBO-initiated commercial development projects.
Groups like I-CARE and POWER proved that multinational coalitions
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could be built by reform and progressive leadership that mobilized and or­
ganized among the masses. These groups forged unity and brought grass­
roots actors and other ordinary citizens into motion around substantive 
and politically symbolic issues of struggle important to both neighborhood- 
based groups and their constituents among the working poor and unem­
ployed across the city.
Thus there was a coincidence between this reform neighborhood devel­
opment agenda and the core demands of the black empowerment 
movement for fairness, open government, and ethical practices. When 
stripped of its ideological and rhetorical symbolism, the neighborhood de­
velopment agenda was compatible with the short-term aims of the black 
and Latino empowerment movements. The neighborhood movement de­
manded equitable resource allocation to black and Latino communities, 
enforcement of affirmative action and minority set-aside mandates, access 
to government policymaking, to information, and to public officeholders, 
along with the elimination of patronage with respect to public employ­
ment, contracts, and provision of public service. One reason for this 
compatibility of interest was that the community development movement 
originated out of these nationality movements among Black and Latino 
community activists and developed alongside of them.
This was the case of the Task Force for Black Political Empowerment, the 
informal arm of the Harold Washington campaign within the black com­
munity. Some of the same actors in the community-based movement were 
instrumental in its formation: Nancy Jefferson, Joe Banks, Dorothy Till­
man, Marian Stamps, Robert Lucas, and others played leading roles in 
both formations. A similar development took place among Puerto Ricans 
and Mexicans who formed a Latino Empowerment Task Force.
The agendas emerging within the nationality movements and within the 
community-based development movement among housing and economic 
development activists were convergent and interdependent. The basic 
point of convergence turned out to be the need for a reform agenda, the 
targeting of public policymakers for public policy changes, and the sup­
port for an alliance between the working poor and community 
development actors in the neighborhoods. They brought black, Latino, 
white, and other leaders to the table and provided a context within which a 
black-led empowerment movement could find legitimacy and acceptance 
outside the black political community. This convergence in the campaign 
was able to take place because a high level o f  sociopolitical netw orking and  
association al linkages was in existence p rior to  the Washington campaign. 
The movement underpinning Harold Washington was not just spon­
taneous, although indeed there was spontaneity at the grass-roots level and 
much innovativeness. That such creativeness did come out of the grass­
roots movement certainly charged up the campaign organization and kept
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it alive. But to say that it was purely a spontaneous thing— all resistance 
and no plan— would be incorrect.
As early as 1981, in the black community, Harold Washington had been 
identified as a potential candidate; in the white community progressives 
like Slim Coleman had put him on their circuit, speaking to CBOs at their 
annual conventions. Citywide organizations did the same. So in that sense 
it was a deliberate effort to build a neighborhood agenda. Of course 
Harold Washington addressed their concerns. This agenda building culmi­
nated in the late summer of 1982 in what was called the All-Chicago 
Community Summer Congress, which brought activists from community 
organizations and independent political organizations together to unite 
around a neighborhood (or community-based) agenda for economic devel­
opment, housing development, health care, education, etc. It had certain 
planks in it that were similar to most of the things that community organi­
zations fight for today— affordable housing, affordable health care, the 
idea of linked development or balanced growth in terms of the city’s alloca­
tion of resources.
So there was also planning by a conscious leadership element. They had 
gained experience in successful coalition building and positioned them­
selves at critical vantage points on the political landscape that represented 
Chicago in the 1980—1983 period. The willingness to network, reach out, 
and develop common agendas and resistance efforts was a positive con­
tribution of these early, fragile coalition efforts. They survived because the 
local agenda was respected and the membership was tolerant of divergence 
from the generally accepted principles guiding local practices and because 
serious attempts were made to work out differences in healthy internal 
debate.
This movement, then, fed into the three main social bases within Harold 
Washington’s coalition. There was the nationality vote: most blacks, a ma­
jority of Latinos, and a significant number of reform-minded whites. The 
Latino and progressive white vote was very critical to his election. In the 
primary election of 1983, the critical ingredient was progressive whites. Al­
though Washington received 80 pecent of the black vote, 17 percent of his 
coalition was white, and that provided him with the margin of victory. In 
the general election, Latinos provided the critical margin of victory. He was 
able to improve from 25 percent of the Latino vote in the primary to about 
65 percent of the Latino vote in the general election. Washington garnered 
75  percent of the Puerto Rican vote, 62 percent of the Mexican vote, and 52 
percent of the Cuban vote.
The second basis of support underpinning his coalition consisted of 
C BO s and community activists. The third was his ability to gain at least the 
nominal support of many of the locals in the Chicago Federation of Labor, 
and in the general election he got the nominal support of the Chicago 
Federation of Labor and the active support of many of the locals.
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Harold Washington in Office 1983-1987: 
Limitations on Reform Gains
Once in office, the Washington governance coalition found three sources 
of support: First was the unity of black, brown, and white forces as under­
scored by the presence of community activists. Community-based actors 
played roles not only in Washington’s election organization but in the tran­
sition team; and some went on to play important roles in his adminis­
tration. This set the stage for a new division of public resources in favor of a 
shift toward neighborhood-based expenditures— more so than in the pre­
ceding administrations.
Then there were the much publicized “council wars.” These “wars” rep­
resented the initial (1983 -1986) division in the 50-member city council 
between the weaker Washington forces and the majority bloc of white 
aldermen, consisting of the old guard ward bosses— or the “ Vrdolyak 2 9 ,” 
as they were called. However, the “council wars” enabled Mayor Wash­
ington to keep the community-based coalition and his primary social 
base— which was largely black and Latino— intact.
Third, within this unity-from-below, Washington was able to maintain 
the support of the black political elites and machine veterans— particularly 
black city council members and party committeemen and -women—  
because he had carried their wards. Washington outpolled each of the 
black machine aldermen and made possible the election of a number of 
antimachine candidates.9
Inside of this development we witnessed a certain fragmentation begin­
ning in 1983. The first signs of division appeared very early in the black 
community in the struggle over who was going to succeed Washington 
in his vacated seat in the first congressional district. Lu Palmer was sup­
ported by the nationalists in the black community. They saw it as very 
important, symbolically, to be able to name the successor to Harold. But 
fragmentation was evident in that not less than eight candidates cam­
paigned for the seat. Each claimed to be a staunch supporter of Washing­
ton’s reform agenda. Washington endorsed Charles Hayes, a noted labor 
leader, who easily defeated Palmer in a low-turnout election and subse­
quent runoff.
The rift between Washington and the black nationalists then grew wider. 
It became apparent within the nationalist forces in the Task Force for Black 
Political Empowerment (e.g., in their concern over Lu Palmer’s failed con­
gressional bid and over the inability of nationalists to cash in on their 
support for Harold Washington and win primacy for the “black nationalist 
agenda”). Unity continued to unravel around issues of black-Latino 
middle-class access to scarce public sector jobs and contracts. The split was 
couched in nationalist terms, however.
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What Washington Delivered
For the most part, Washington’s administration made major steps to­
ward delivery on the neighborhood agenda. This was necessary, but it was 
insufficient for addressing the tremendous substantive problems facing the 
low-income communities in the city. Moreover, Washington was sur­
rounded by numerous persons at all levels of influence in government—  
formal and informal— who did not share his agenda of concerns nor that 
of the neighborhood development interests. Yet, these five years were dra­
matically distinctive from any period of city government in Chicago’s 
history.
I think that the Washington victory and the consolidation of his admin­
istration resulted in the institutionalization of a new base of power in 
opposition to the machine. It is not clear if it functioned any differently, but 
it was not the machine as we knew it. In fact, I remember Washington 
speaking at a rally in front of Daley Plaza during the 1983 campaign, when 
he said that “The machine, as we now know it, is dead.” At subsequent 
times he would speak of the machine and patronage in the same terms. 
M ost people only focused on the fact that the machine was dead, as op­
posed to the notion that only the machine as we knew it was dead.
The need to institutionalize a base of power is something that is central 
to American politics and to any regime. Even if we assume that patronage is 
dead, you need to have a political organization that functions in the same 
way. If privilege is dead, then what is the incentive for political 
involvement— unless there are some direct or indirect payoffs? Perhaps a 
new morality that transcends the politics of individualism is required.10
The CBO provided an excellent alternative form for that. It did not pro­
vide direct patronage, but it was possible to build up a patronage-type 
army, a machine army, without the individual (privilege) payoff. It was pos­
sible to use the new neighborhood agenda as a framework within which 
access was given to neighborhood-based actors without the corruption 
that is associated with the under-the-table deals of the previous ward 
bosses. KOCO, for example, had its staff increased by four or five people in 
a five-year period; and other organizations emerged and had city-funded 
staff positions. The city did substantially increase its delegate agencies. The 
shift in spending from downtown to the neighborhoods represented a shift 
in resources allocation. It assumed that the bureaucracy could function 
better to deliver services if it were at the street level. So we witnessed the 
expansion of a street-level bureaucracy without a street level government 
(i.e., democracy). About $13 million of CDBG funding for staff positions 
were taken out of the city government and put in the neighborhood 
agencies. That represented a change to the extent that neighborhood- 
based organizations were in control of staff people who were supposed to
CHICAGO POLITICS AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 55
be delivering the services to the constituencies in the neighborhoods. Pre­
sumably, this would lead to better service and more direct accountability.11
Yet some would have questioned whether or not that was a critical im­
provement. If the effect was to have better control at the local level over 
people who were providing services, then this change was a significant gain 
only if it led to more effective service delivery. But the effect was merely to 
contain and control the community activists through co-optation, then we 
had made a tragic mistake. The effect in either case seemed to reduce the 
independence of CBOs.
There were a number of more immediate results for the neighborhood 
organizations as well. We got greater access to decision making, implemen­
tation and evaluation, and just plain old information. It was now possible 
to find out what was happening in the city to a far greater extent (with re­
spect to city expenditures and city planning) than ever happened before. It 
made sense from a community activist standpoint to be able to walk into 
Harold’s office (to some folks this was the ultimate example of access). It 
made sense to be able to pick up the phone and talk to the commissioner of 
economic development, as opposed to having to write a letter, and maybe 
you would get an answer to in two weeks, and maybe you would get a meet­
ing in two months.
There was m ore equitable resource distribution across Chicago. Part­
nerships were created where public sector resources were used to leverage 
private sector investments of benefit to low-income individuals and fam­
ilies. CBOs were treated less like junior partners (if they had been treated as 
partners at all) and more like legitimate participants in the development 
process. This administration increased the opportunity of CBOs to bring 
resources to the table. The more they had resources similar to what devel­
opers were looking for, the more they were treated as equal partners in the 
process.
There was m ore budgetary scrutiny. For the first time we had a series of 
public hearings around all the major city budgets. That meant something 
from the standpoint of neighborhoods having input into the budgetary 
process. This included the CDBG and the corporate budget. And a similar 
process was beginning to emerge around the capital budget, the capital 
plan for infrastructure development, although that piece had not been con­
solidated when Washington died. There were some efforts underway under 
the Sawyer administration and within the city council under the newly 
formed Capital Development Committee that had been set up by Wash­
ington. Its purpose was to take a look— just as was done with the CDBG 
budget— to see if there was a way to set up criteria that would lead to more 
equitable distribution of capital resources to all the neighborhoods of the 
city.
Another strength of the administration was the establishment of more
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representative governm ent. A key point here is not only that it was more 
dem ocratic in terms of proportional representation of nationalities in the 
city council and on boards and commissions but also that there was greater 
inclusion of other previously excluded elements of the population. We be­
gan to see a more diverse coalition in governance than at any other time in 
C hicago’s history.
Washington appointed people with strong neighborhood backgrounds 
and orientations to important positions of policymaking in his govern­
m ent. They had a great deal of influence in subsequent governmental 
neighborhood policy and strategic planning. It was radical for some people 
that some side streets would get snowplowed in the winter time— side 
streets, that is, that never got plowed before. 1 lived on one of those streets, 
and I was shocked beyond belief to see a snowplow come down my South 
Side street in the winter of 1984. It was outside of my experience— I 
couldn’t imagine what that sound was. The streets got plowed on the South 
Side of Chicago! It was great! Some streets even got paved on the South Side 
o f Chicago! The streets also got paved on those WPA (Works Project 
Administration) streets in some of the white ethnic neighborhoods, and 
that made a difference in Washington’s image for whites in the city as well.
In attempts to reach out to all Chicago, Harold Washington moved his 
coalition onto a broader base. It also made it more conservative, as he in­
cluded more constituents. Had Mayor Washington’s tenure continued, it is 
conceivable that his administration would have made an even greater shift 
toward conservatism. By the very nature of the governance process, as more 
divergent elements were included into the support of the administration, 
more practical compromises had to be made to maintain the divergent ele­
ments within the coalition.
Limitations of the Washington Program
There was also a downside for the community organizations: to some 
extent and for some time there was a loss o f  independence an d  initiative 
a m o n g  CBO s. We took coalition building for granted. We operated as if all 
that we had to do was to proclaim movement politics or profess to be a 
supporter of black—Latino or black-white unity and . . . Presto!— we got 
instant unity!— when our experience had been that solidarity is forged in 
struggle and then debated and tested in battle.
Community activists clamored for access. They demanded inclusion. 
W hen you have this thrust you risk a compromise of independence and ini­
tiative at the same time. You may be mesmerized by “palace intrigue,” or 
sometimes you got tied into downtown politics. This did occur. It hap­
pened to the extent that some people overly identified with city hall, to the 
point where they said, “We are in power, we run it.”
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Second (and a parallel to the first point) is that the movement was 
coopted  to the extent that such thoughts prevailed as “we can’t do any­
thing to embarrass the mayor” or “we put him there so we have to support 
him.”
Co-optation also happened in a third way: many of our important 
fighters in the trenches went to city hall. It’s not that they couldn’t go to city 
hall to work or to serve that’s at issue. The fact is that once they arrived 
there to serve, they quit communicating and listening to the neighborhood 
anymore. Or their relationship to the neighborhood became one of expedi­
ency, as opposed to being a serious and honest relationship that was built 
on prior experience and practice and could be sustained. This becomes an 
important lesson in terms of how to do progressive government work and 
maintain a positive progressive orientation. Some of our friends in govern­
ment have to learn how to do that better.
Reflections
Why did these shortcomings occur? Why weren’t they corrected? Part of 
the problem— and what we learned during 1983-1987— was that Harold 
Washington operated under severe constraints. Many of us had an unin­
formed view of big city mayors. We did not fully understand how much a 
black, progressive mayor would be limited by his constitutional role but 
also by the political economy in which he functioned. First, racism per­
sisted under the Washington administration. We saw that in the “council 
wars.” We saw it in the 1987 and 1989 elections. The adverse reaction of 
party leadership was dramatic and enduring, and was a source for racial 
polarization and a cause for maintenance of political narrow-mindedness 
within the electorate. The media continuously cast the Washington admin­
istration in a negative light and contributed to reinforcement of racial 
polarization.
Independent of racism, there was the bureaucracy, a complex web of re­
lations, procedures, and regulatory functions that provided continuity but 
impeded innovation. Under Washington, not only was there a half-century- 
old entrenched bureaucracy, there was the patronage-laden city govern­
ment that resisted innovation because change was perceived as not in the 
patronage workers’ interest.
A third constraint was the relationship of local government to the 
county, other taxing bodies, and other legislative bodies at the state and 
federal levels. This was most significant— perhaps more than most people 
realize. Washington’s push for an urban agenda was hampered by the 
Republican control at the state and federal level.
Some people looked to Harold Washington to provide an immediate re­
lief for substantive conditions outside of his control like jobs or more
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affordable housing. At best, he could set the tone and encourage model 
programs.
And there is the question of the relationship of city hall to the banking 
community on LaSalle Street. It is very significant that the leading bankers 
went in to see Harold and shake hands with him, as opposed to picking up 
the phone. They did so to let him know that they could shut down the city. 
And that is important for any radical or progressive to understand about 
the urban political economy— that the banks rule the government, the 
mayor only manages it. It is significant that one of Washington’s first acts 
(like Jane Byrne before him and Sawyer after him) was to go to the bond 
houses in New York in order to assure Wall Street (and LaSalle Street) that 
there was no problem in Chicago that could not be made manageable, that 
the city was bankable, and that an environment favorable to business and 
investment in the city was being maintained. Without these assurances the 
city’s ability to borrow money at favorable interest rates or to sell bonds 
would be seriously jeopardized.
Apart from these constraints, other limitations on the gains many ex­
pected from Washington in office only became apparent after his death, in 
the way his governing coalition splintered and accentuated the fragmenta­
tion that had already begun. It unraveled most profoundly with the 
disintegration of the Washington coalition in the city council. First, the 
black council members with the weakest links to the progressive reform 
movement began to engage in acts of individual political opportunism. 
Feeling that they had nothing to fear from a fragmented reform movement 
without the powerful persona of Washington, some black council members 
immediately went out to cut deals with the old guard while ostensibly sup­
porting Acting Mayor Eugene Sawyer. It is clear that they abandoned the 
reform agenda. Others were less daring even though they might have been 
tempted. These divisions had a major impact upon subsequent political de­
velopments in city politics.
Several other black and Latino council members appeared to have aban­
doned the reform agenda, if not the respective black and Latino 
nationality-specific agendas of their community in 1989, though it was not 
clear whether their newly formed alignments with the rejuvenated machine 
would enhance their political futures.
The missing factor, which had been present in 1983, was the mobilizing 
base that had been provided by the CBOs. How did we lose this? This ques­
tion hangs over us now. It is clear that by 1987 Harold Washington was 
funding a number of organizations that differed markedly from the orig­
inal C BO  constituency: neighborhood retail and industrial retention 
organizations are examples. Many of these did not meet CDBG guidelines 
for low-income eligibility. The coalition was weaker as a result in 1987. 
Thus, community based participation was perhaps the most problematic 
aspect of the Washington administration.
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W ashington em braced  the m ost salient aspects o f  the community- 
directed  developm en t fram ew ork. One current irony is that a result of 
Harold Washington’s positive response to the neighborhood development 
agenda was that it placed a cap on the insurgent-oriented energies emanat­
ing from CBOs and the community development movement. But part of 
the problem was in our own organization and tactics. We had no organiza­
tion that could maintain some discipline, an organization where people felt 
they had a reference group they could relate to as a source of strength. We 
met at lunch and we struggled around things, but there was no overarching 
political and organizational unity. Everyone was free to be as freewheeling 
and irresponsible as he or she wanted to be. On the other hand, we became 
so immersed in day-to-day tasks that we lost sight of the forest and the 
horizon.
We d id  n ot prepare new  leadership  at the grass-roots level. The source of 
strength of Chicago’s neighborhoods is the fact that indigenous leaders 
emerged and matured. They articulated issues on behalf of their consti­
tuencies and there was some level of accountability, in some form— block 
clubs, organizations, tenant unions, welfare recipients organizations, and 
the like. And there was a flowering of leadership in the campaign period 
when new actors surfaced and in the early governance period when new 
voices began to be heard in pubic policy. But those voices are now old 
voices in the sense that no new indigenous leadership emerged in 1983— 
1989.
Finally, there is the question of factionalization o f  the leadership, and the 
reemergence of top-down leadership. This is the carryover from the Wash­
ington period, in the sense that self-proclaimed community leaders speak 
for the low-income communities of Chicago or the affordable housing 
community without consultation or accountability to their constituents. It 
is just assumed that these leaders came out of a neighborhood context. 
Given the fact that there is no organization that can force accountabil­
ity, they become self-proclaimed. The surprising thing is that the most 
prominent figures doing this were not Johnny-come-latelies. They were vet­
erans of movement politics who should have known that movements are 
products of hard work and are most successful when there is clarity of col­
lective thought and strategy based upon hard critical thinking.
Conclusion: Toward a New Agenda
I think that there are important implications of the Washington ad­
ministration at both the local and the national level. The Washington 
victory and subsequent governance period represented a magic moment of
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international importance. To say that is to say there was something beauti­
ful about it and something that brought the dead to life. People who had 
been dead since the 1960s, not in a physical sense but emotionally, spir­
itually dead, came alive! 1 saw and worked with winos who put on ties and 
picked up their pens and clipboards and walked precincts during the 
H arold Washington campaign. Harold was correct when he said, “You go 
out of the city, you go out of the country, you go out of the continent and 
people will say, ‘How’s Harold? What’s happening in Chicago?’ ”
There is still the sense today that people look to Chicago for innovation 
in terms of progressive politics and on economic development issues. The 
Chicago Rehab Network served as a model for other cities on how coali­
tions can be put together on a multinational, multiracial basis. The same 
thing is true with CWED. It had gained national reputation as a center of 
the community economic development movement. That’s important, and 
we don’t have to mention the Jesse Jackson experience at all.
W in or lose, Chicago has facilitated that sense of movement around the 
country among blacks and Latinos; call it coalition politics or call it the 
“Rainbow.” More importantly, in our analysis the Rainbow has better 
prospects for staying alive and building at the local level than it has na­
tionally, until the development of linkages between national and local 
constituencies.
But in Chicago we have fragmentation in black politics. The current cri­
sis in political leadership in the electoral arena is only one manifestation of 
that. It poses grave problems for the “new democratic coalition,” the so- 
called Rainbow.
A sense of conflict, competitiveness and rivalry also exists between 
blacks and Latinos. Jane Byrne tried to play off blacks and Latinos in 
1 9 8 0 —1982, but unsuccessfully. This happened again in the fragmentation 
of the coalition around the “Washington 2 6 ” after 1987, and later in the 
split between progressive Latino aldermen— with Luis Gutierrez, on one 
side, and Jesus Garcia and Raymond Figureroa, on the other. This was not 
good for the progressive movement in Chicago.
Now, what’s the road forward? In the midst of the current crisis, I think 
that there are several things we need to do. First is this notion of a mass 
organ ization . In other words, bottom-up politics. The KOCOs, the 
M CC s, the Lawndale People’s Planning Action are good. They are neces­
sary but not sufficient. We n eed a  mass organization that can take  up 
substantive issues on  the basis o f  a  m ass com m on program . Community 
organizations are limited: they are dependent upon external sources of 
funding. We need to encourage and build self-standing, independent mass 
organizations. Both are necessary and neither is sufficient. Existing com­
munity groups have by necessity had to form coalitions. What we need is a 
monolithic organization, a unifying homogeneous mass organization that
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can raise up a standard of struggle around class-based issues facing the vast 
numbers of citizens.
Why is this imperative? It is doubtful that traditional party organiza­
tions and candidates making their routine campaign appeals will continue 
to excite the vast majority of poor people. They will not be believable. Only 
an organization with mass leadership can move beyond the reform agenda.
Second, we need independence and initiative in the movement. We’ve 
lost some of that, and until we regain it, regardless of who is elected mayor, 
we are at a loss without it. Until we do this we will compromise the progres­
sive character of our politics, whoever gets to be mayor. Harold was less 
effective because he didn’t have a strong independent movement. He was 
the movement! He was the movement personified in city hall— to the ex­
tent that we said, “We don’t want to embarrass the Mayor,” and “Let’s not 
initiate anything until we check with city hall.” And so we checked—  
privately or publicly— with city hall in order to find out what we ought to 
be doing. We did this without coming up with our own initiatives.
If that initiative had been there we could have clarified the lines between 
who runs and who really rules Chicago. If this had been happening, then 
LaSalle Street would not have been able to bulldog Harold into making 
compromises that were not in the best interests of the city. Washington 
would have been able to say: “My hands are tied; my constituents are say­
ing this is what I should do.”
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cisco: Synthesis Publications, 1984); and Alkalimat and Gills, The Task Force for 
Black Political Empowerment: Beyond the Crisis in Black Power in Chicago 
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Politics: The Search for Political Power (New York: Longmans, 1987).
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(Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1987); T. Robert Gurr and Desmond King, 
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land, Power and Crisis in the City (New York: Schocken Books, 1983); and Terry 
N. Clark and Lorna C. Ferguson, City Money (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1983).
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D ecline (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); and Abdul Alkalimat and 
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4. Daniel Fusfeld and Timothy Bates, The Political Economy o f  the Urban Ghetto 
(Carbondale; Southern Illinois University Press, 1984); William J. Wilson, The 
Declining Significance o f  Race (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1978); also 
Wilson’s The Truly Disadvantaged (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
5. Alkalimat and Gills, Harold Washington, pp. 126-131; also Michael 
B. Preston, “Black Politics in the Post-Daley Era,” in S. Gove and L. Massotti, eds., 
Politics in Chicago After Daley (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1981).
6. See Alkalimat and Gills, Harold Washington; also Melvin Holli and Paul 
Green, The Making o f  a Black Mayor (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 
1984).
7. In 1963 a movement called “Protest at the Polls” was launched by black activ­
ists who targeted Chicago’s lack of effective civil rights policies that respected the 
dignity of African-Americans within the city. In 1966, the principal struggles were 
over desegregation of housing and the public schools and specifically the student 
boycotts of the notorious “Willis Wagons”— mobile classrooms ordered by Gen­
eral Superintendent Ben Willis to keep black students confined to overcrowded 
segregated schools. In 1967, Dick Gregory’s insult level reached the point that he 
announced a new party in protest to the regular Democratic party in Cook County 
and launched a protest candidacy for mayor. The conditions of blacks in central 
cities like Chicago were the root causes of the rebellions, uprisings, and riots follow­
ing the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. In Chicago Mayor Daley 
reacted by ordering the Chicago police to “shoot to kill” looters as well as arsonists. 
The black response was to disrupt the Democratic National Convention and em­
barrass the mayor, who told convention delegates that there were no slums in 
Chicago.
8. Some call them political assassinations; others call them murders because they 
were premeditated. As later evidence tends to indicate, Hampton and Clark did not 
resist the police who broke into their house. They were shot at although they were 
without guns in their hands. The community response to that was to india the sys­
tem and to intensify the efforts to resolve some of the glaring examples of police 
misconduct within the Black community.
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9. These included Rush {2nd ward), Hutchinson (9th), Beavers (7th), Langford 
(16th), Tillman (3rd), W. Davis (28th), and Smith (27th), In the redistricted special 
ward elections of 1986, Gutierrez, Soliz, Garcia, and Figueroa all won election 
along with Carter (15th) and Giles (37th), providing Washington with a new major­
ity in the city council.
10. The idea that the community-based network was a potential organizational 
as opposed to ideological alternative to the machine was current in Chicago— as a 
rhetorical point in the press and from members of the “Vrdolyak 29” during the 
“council wars” period. Kari Moe and 1 discussed whether it might be a real possi­
bility at that time. There is a whole body of Marxist and left popular literature that 
argues that collective goods redistribution and collective interests within consti­
tuencies can serve to motivate political activism without regard to personal 
material incentives. The people who supported Harold Washington as volunteers 
were not paid, were not promised jobs. They believed in the agenda. The issue is 
that there must be a political organization that functions like a party to get out the 
vote, to register voters, to canvass voters, to nominate and promote candidates to 
bear their standard. The return to such participation need not be privatized or indi­
vidualized. The beauty of the Washington period was that a whole sector of the 
population derived symbolic and collective benefits from his victory. Thus a new 
politics was made possible even if some of his supporters didn’t agree with it. Recall 
that as soon as Washington died it was the black aldermen in the city council and 
black committee members in the predominantly black wards who swung into mo­
tion, initiating deals and making overtures to restore the old politics of patronage— 
Chicago’s greatest tradition of the past 60 years.
11. Community activists within the Chicago Rehab Network such as Bob Lucas, 
Nancy Jefferson, Slim Coleman, and Maureen Hellwig argued forcefully that the 
city should delegate its neighborhood service functions to nonprofit community- 
based groups who could be certified as legitimate contractors. In 1982, under 
Mayor Byrne, there were less than 50 such agencies receiving CDBG contracts. By 
1987 there were nearly 350 agencies who were receiving contracts to provide 
various neighborhood services on behalf of the city. During Mayor Washington’s 
first budget in 1983, he reprogrammed some $13 million to nonprofit agencies— 
away from the Departments of Housing, Human Services, and Economic Develop­
ment into community-based “delegate agencies.”
